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Abstract
Current decision-support frameworks to assist mitigation planning do not in-
clude uncertainty and complexity of network failures, either one or both. To
close this research gap, this thesis walks through a demonstration of the im-
portance of including uncertainty in the decision analysis to later propose a
novel methodology that employs simulation data that encapsulates both un-
certainty and complexity of failures modeled by domain experts. Thus, this
work is divided in two parts. The first part of this work examines how com-
ponent importance measures fail to give the necessary intuition for mitigation
planning in the light of uncertainty. The analysis is assisted by a novel compo-
nent importance measure called probabilistic delta centrality that demonstrates
how previously neglected stochastic considerations change decisions suggested.
In the second part, a new paradigm for stochastic network mitigation is pro-
posed. The approach leverages realizations from scenario event simulations to
develop a probabilistic framework that supports constrained decision making.
This scenario event simulation framework is capable of comprising component
fragilities, correlation among random variables, and other physical aspects
that affect component failure probabilities. On the top of that, a statistical
learning model is built to enable a rapid estimation of post-disruption im-
pact, which permits a metaheuristic to intelligently explore feasible discrete
x
enhancements from mitigation strategies. The search for near-optimal solu-
tions can be restricted by limited resources and potential political, social, and
safety limitations. Two examples are presented to exhibit how this method pro-
vides detailed information for mitigation. The level of complexity embedded
in search along with its detailed solutions are pioneering in network mitigation
planning.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Physical infrastructure networks are the backbone of modern society. Pre-
venting large disruptions on them is associated to alleviating not only massive
economic losses, but also preventing social issues (as population dislocation),
and life threatening scenarios. However, the current state of these networks
have serious shortfalls. For example, the American Society of Civil Engineers
found 56,007 of the nation’s bridges to be structurally deficient in 2016 and
cite the funding necessary to rehabilitate them at $123 billion [3]. Clearly,
the deteriorating physical infrastructure in the US is already susceptible to
failure and even more so for certain types of natural disasters. In this context,
pre-disaster mitigation analysis arises as a multidisciplinary area in which one
key thrust is towards developing models of real-world physical systems and
their hazard responses with a goal of providing risk-informed decision support
from a systemic perspective. Decreasing the probability of failure of network
components (nodes/links) via improvements/upgrades is the most frequent in-
tervention studied because the installation of new components skyrocket costs
1
[4]. Thus, the focus of this work is in optimizing the way we select components
in a physical network to improve, in the light of its system vulnerability to
natural disasters.
Figure 1.1: Worldwide air transportation network [1]. It is an example of a
network prone to costly disruptions.
Two distinct methods to address this problem are going to be foundational for
this work: component importance measures and stochastic network design. In
this thesis, we incorporate network failure characteristic to each of these two
methods in different manners with the objective of providing more accurate
and comprehensive insight for decision-making.
Network component importance measures (CIMs) quantify one or several as-
pects of the topology and/or functionality of the network to indirectly capture
the impact of component failures. Then, components are ranked according
to these values and those highly ranked are considered the most critical and,
therefore, prioritized for mitigation or protection. However, in the light of
uncertainty in component failures, we demonstrate that they do not provide
sufficient intuition. On the other hand, the stochastic network design problem
naturally incorporates uncertainty of stochastic events in networks and sup-
ports constrained optimization. Nevertheless, current solution methods based
2
on sampling incorporating limited complexity aspects of network failures.
This thesis proposes an approach that is able to incorporate both uncertainty
and complexity network failures by extensively using external data from do-
main experts (based on simulation) to solve the novel formulation of the
stochastic network design problem for mitigation. For this, we leverage sim-
ulation data to set up a probabilistic framework that supports constrained
decision making. The network of study can be any physical network (modeled
as either a directed or indirected graph) with the requirement that it should
be feasible to estimate the effects between component improvement and its
probability to remain present in the network after a disaster. In addition, this
method does not focus on a specific performance metric as [5], but it leaves
to the user the selection of a suitable performance metric for her own needs.
We demonstrate the flexibility of this methodology with two examples with
different networks and performance metrics.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces
the background that is foundational for this thesis. Chapter 3 develops a
method to incorporate uncertainty in component importance measures, to fi-
nally conclude that they should be avoided. Chapter 4 presents the data-based
methodology to incorporate complexity in mitigation planning, which is the
main contribution of this work. Then, we present two examples with different
settings in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Chapter 7 summarizes this work and its
conclusions. Finally, Chapter 8 states future research work envisioned.
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Chapter 2
Background
Physical networks are interconnected systems that transport goods and ser-
vices whose nodes and links physically exist. Some examples of these networks
are electric power networks, watter supply/sewage networks, and fiber optic
networks. Due to the importance of the goods and services that these net-
works supply, failure on them interrupts the normal development of society
(e.g. Figure 2.1) with not only economic consequences but it also deteriorates
quality of life. Sabotage, human error in operation, terrorism, and natural dis-
asters are examples of hazards that if affecting physical networks, would have
different failure outcomes. For example, merely single component1 failures are
unlikely outcomes for large scale natural disasters [6, 7, 8] while this is may
be a common pattern for terrorist attacks [9].
The focus of this work is in network vulnerability due to natural hazards.
Natural disaster are highly impactful sporadic events that may affect a broad
geographic area. Affected areas contain several networks going through them,
1Component is either a node or link.
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Figure 2.1: Obstruction in highway.
which if some of their components get affected, it may require a major effort to
recover their previous functionality. Additionally, each day that these compo-
nents are not fully functional may be millions of dollars lost for the economy.
Clearly, disruption of these systems should be prevented whenever is possible.
Among the four stages of the disaster cycle, i.e., mitigation, preparedness, re-
sponse, and recovery [10], this thesis focuses on pre-disaster mitigation strate-
gies. Network-specific mitigation interventions can be broadly classified in two
groups: topological interventions (e.g., redundant construction, incrementing
roadway capacity) and reliability-based interventions (e.g., structural retrofit,
maintenance). Given the high costs of topological interventions in physical
networks, reliability-based interventions are preferred.
Structural retrofit/upgrade is an example of a reliability-based intervention
that provokes an increment in the likelihood to withstand a natural disaster
(known as survivability probability). For example, for seismic scenarios, seis-
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mic retrofit with steel jackets in columns (Figure 2.2) can shift the structure’s
fragility curve, which is translated to a discrete increment in the survival prob-
ability of the structure. A seismic fragility curve is a statistical tool that relates
in a probabilistic manner structural damage with structural and seismic char-
acteristics. Similar artifacts are being developed for floods and hurricanes to
assess their survival probability.
Figure 2.2: Seismic retrofit for bridge using steel jackets in columns. Left:
before retrofit; right: after retrofit.
For a decision-maker who wants to plan mitigation actions from a systemic
perspective, the problem is about allocating resources to improve a set of com-
ponents (one or more) that, by increasing their survival probability, the overall
expected impact given a natural disaster would be minimal. Two methods that
are capable to support decision-makers on this problem are component impor-
tance measures and stochastic network design.
2.1. Component Importance Measures (CIMs)
One common approach in network mitigation literature is based on employing
component importance measures (CIMs). Methods to compute component
6
importance consist on measuring one or several aspects of the topology and/or
functionality of the network. Once a CIM is calculated for all components,
highly ranked components are recommended to be prioritized in mitigation
interventions [11, 12, 13, 14].
There is a group of CIMs that share the underlying idea that the most impor-
tant components are the ones whose disruption is the most impactful to an
overall performance metric. We call that group impact-based CIMs. The CIM
computation is primarily related to the choice of the network performance
metric evaluated. For example, if the system metric is related to graph con-
nectivity, an impact-based CIM would evaluate components on their ability to
disconnect the network. Examples of performance metrics include network effi-
ciency [15, 16, 17], travel demand [18], and travel time for all origin-destination
nodes [9].
2.2. Stochastic Network Design (SND)
Stochastic network design (SND) is a problem setup that brings a different
perspective to formulating mitigation in networks. In a stochastic network, the
nodes and edges are either present or absent with certain probabilities. The
probability of being present can be incremented via improvement interventions
(also referred as management actions) to the component. This problem is
conceived as a constrained optimization problem and falls within the category
of NP-hard problems [19]. For mitigation, this problem can be re-formulated
as the search for an optimal allocation strategy for available resources to reduce
post-disruption impact.
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Solution methods for the general form of the SND problem are based on ap-
proximate methods rooted in sampling. The most prominent one is sample
average approximation (SAA) [20] that approximates the original stochastic
problem to a deterministic one. For this, it employs Monte Carlo sampling
from known probability distributions to identify the most frequent cases, and
then solves the optimization problem for them. It disregards the least frequent
cases after showing that these rare scenarios do not affect much the optimal
solution. Specific methods use SAA along with intelligent search, greedy algo-
rithms and mixed integer programming, sometimes as a two-stage stochastic
optimization (e.g. [5, 21, 19]). Optimality convergence may be guaranteed for
n→∞ depending on the deterministic optimization method selected [22].
2.3. Uncertainty and Complexity of Network
Failures
Network failures due to natural disasters present two interconnected modeling
facets: uncertainty and complexity. Uncertainty is embedded in modeling and
simulating the damage state of network components in an stochastic manner,
as per [23]. Damage estimation models are probabilistic artifacts to estimate
probable damage patterns, which are configurations of components with an as-
sociated level of damage. Correlations and dependencies introduce complexity
within component failures that affect their uncertainty. Dependencies among
components from the same network and with components from other networks
is considered key in modeling failure for some physical networks [24]. An ex-
ample of the effect of this is the following: “Failure of A and B leads to failure
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of C.” On the other hand, there are correlated failures among components,
which may explain more than 20% of the damage in some systems [25]. An
example of the effect of this is the following: “Failure of A increases probability
of failure of B.”
Figure 2.3: Uncertainty and complexity in network failures.
However, component importance measures and the stochastic network design
problem do not fully incorporate these two aspects of network failures.
CIMs do not incorporate the uncertainty and complexity of component fail-
ures, which may prevent them to provide optimal guidance. One natural
consequence of network failure uncertainty that has not been comprehen-
sively included in CIMs is multiple component failures. Several authors using
CIMs have focused their analysis in analyzing the effect of isolated failures
[11, 16, 17, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. However, using this simplification may
lead to misleading decisions because large synergistic effects of multiple si-
multaneous component failures may be overlooked [33]. For example, when
comparing the loss of one major electrical substation versus the loss of two mi-
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nor substations, it may be the case that the two minor ones failing represent
a greater risk [34].
On the contrary, SND naturally incorporates uncertainty and there are some
advances in incorporating complexity. As noted before, in disaster scenar-
ios, independent failures are replaced by spatiotemporal correlated failures [7].
Some specific correlation has been investigated using sampling methods aided
with probabilistic graphical models [35]. However, domain experts rely on
other correlation methods based on experimentation (e.g. spatial correlation
model for seismic ground motion [36]) that have not been included yet in SAA
sampling methods. Conversely, dependencies as previously described may be
incorporated in these samplers, but to the best of our knowledge they have
not.
Uncertainty and complexity of network failures are captured in failure patterns,
which are built by domain experts using multi-layer Monte Carlo simulations
that embed results from hazard models, network estimation models, and func-
tionality assessment. Unfortunately, SAA relies on samplers and is unable to
incorporate these rich pre-defined datasets. The methodology that we propose
is completely different from SAA because it comprises these datasets using
machine learning to incorporate both uncertainty and complexity to the SND
for mitigation. In Figure 2.4, we summarize SAA pros and cons from this
perspective.
In the rest of this thesis, we incorporate uncertainty in component impor-
tance measures to show how they fail to provide sufficient insight for decision-
making. Subsequently, we define the stochastic network design for mitigation
and present our proposed methodology to incorporate complexity.
10
Figure 2.4: Pros and cons of using SAA
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Chapter 3
Incorporating Failure Uncertainty
in CIMs
In this chapter, stochastic characteristics from component failures are included
in a novel CIM called probabilistic delta centrality whose strategies suggested
are contrasted with the ones from impact-based CIMs.
3.1. CIM-based decision-making
3.1.1 CIM Definitions
Let G = (N , E) be the graph (directed or undirected) defined by a set of nodes
N and a set of edges E that mathematically represent a network. Let s − t
pair be a pair of nodes so that a directed path starts from node s (source) and
ends in node t (sink) such that s 6= t. If the graph is undirected, then there is
no distinction between s− t and t− s.
12
Figure 3.1: The positive drop in the performance metric after disruption is
denoted as (∆P ).
Delta Centrality
In general, an impact-based CIM can be constructed from any performance
metric that can be calculated in both a normal and disrupted network. Let P
be a performance metric that meets this requirement. Let (∆P )i be defined as
the drop in the performance metric when component i fails in isolation. Delta
centrality [37], then, is defined in Equation (3.1).
C∆i =
(∆P )i
P
(3.1)
Network efficiency—introduced by [37]—measures how well information or
goods flow in the graph as it considers the inverse of the shortest distance
between each node s and t, dst as shown in Equation (3.2). Its use is prefer-
able for vulnerability analysis because it can handle infinite distances that
occur in disconnected networks.
E =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
s,t∈N|s 6=t
1
dst
(3.2)
Information centrality [38], denoted C∆Ii , defined in Equation (3.3), is a delta
13
centrality based on network efficiency.
C∆Ii =
(∆E)i
E
(3.3)
Note that delta centrality was proposed using a single removal strategy; thus,
we refer to these as individual delta centralities. We now propose a generalized
form of delta centrality.
Synergistic Delta Centrality
Definition 3.1. Synergistic delta centrality. Let sk ⊆ G be a set of k > 1
components in graph G. Let (∆P )sk be the impact in performance metric P
when all components in sk fail simultaneously. The synergistic delta centrality
for sk is (∆P )sk divided by the performance metric P of the network in healthy
state as in Equation (3.4).
C∆sk =
(∆P )sk
P
(3.4)
Notationally, if k = 2 and s2 = {i, j}, then let (∆P )ij denote the impact on P
of the simultaneous failure of components i and j. Additionally, let C∆ij denote
the related synergistic delta centrality.
Similar to the individual delta centrality, a synergistic delta centrality can
be defined based on network efficiency, i.e., synergistic information centrality.
The synergistic delta centrality along with individual delta centralities will be
used to define the probabilistic delta centrality.
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3.1.2 Probabilistic Delta Centrality
A probabilistic view for the delta centrality is proposed to account for real-
world aspects of component failures. This will help to pinpoint limitations of
importance measures with both single and multiple removal strategies.
Definition 3.2. Probabilistic delta centrality. Let δsk be a random variable
associated with the impact in the performance metric P when only elements
belonging to sk fail stochastically. The probabilistic delta centrality is defined
as the expected value of δsk divided by the performance metric P of the network
in healthy state, as in Equation (3.5).
Cδsk =
E
[
δsk
]
P
(3.5)
Note that δsk takes on the value (∆P )i if only component i fails. Likewise, it
takes the value (∆P )ij if only components i and j fail. Let pi and pij be the
probability of the isolated failure of i and probability of the simultaneous fail-
ures of i and j, respectively—the latter probability can handle correlations and
failure dependencies. Then, for two components i and j, E
[
δij
]
is calculated
as in Equation (3.6),
E
[
δij
]
= pi(∆P )i + pj(∆P )j + pij(∆P )ij (3.6)
since (∆P )∅ is zero. By combining Equation (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6) a relation-
ship between the probabilistic, individual and synergistic centralities is derived
in Equation (3.7).
Cδij = piC∆i + pjC∆j + pijC∆ij (3.7)
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Thus, the study of component importance based on the probabilistic delta cen-
trality can account for multiple failures and the probabilities, independent or
correlated, which are associated with those failures. Similarly to the previous
delta centralities, the probabilistic delta centrality for network efficiency will
be referred as the probabilistic information centrality and denoted CδIij .
3.2. Case Study
In this section, an example is used to demonstrate issues relating to CIMs for
mitigation decision-making. The new probabilistic delta centrality provides a
means to quantitatively demonstrate some pitfalls of impact-based CIMs. For
this study, a geometric random graph is chosen as it resembles some critical
infrastructure networks [39, 40]. The graph, depicted in Figure 3.2, has 200
nodes and 534 edges. Each of the CIMs defined in Section 3.1.1 and Section
3.1.2 are computed for the example graph.
Table 3.1 contains the top five most important components with respect to the
CIM information centrality (Equation (3.3)) along with two other components
that will gain importance when analyzing synergistic delta centralities.
Table 3.2 list the top five most critical two-at-a-time failures based on the syn-
ergistic information centrality. The combined failure of components 423 and
503 has the highest C∆Iij value. As seen in Figure 3.2, these two components
act as alternates of the other and their simultaneous failure disconnects the
graph.
Table 3.2 reveals an interesting facet of multiple failures. However, it may
be that the combination of components with the highest synergistic centrality
16
423
503
419
349
309
Figure 3.2: Random geometric graph of 200 nodes and 534 edges. Selected
edge indexes are labeled.
has a very low probability of simultaneous failure. This would be potentially
misleading for mitigation decision-making. The probabilistic delta centrality
can be used to demonstrate how failure probabilities can affect ranking and
thus mitigation decision-making.
3.2.1 Analysis with the Probabilistic Delta Centrality
Consider a simplistic example, based on the topology shown in Figure 3.2, in
which each of the components fail independently and with the same probability
p. Hence, for two components, the probability of exactly one failure is p(1−p),
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Table 3.1: Top five components along with two other components that serve
in the discussion.
i ∈ E C∆Ii
419 0.0536
349 0.0206
112 0.0180
309 0.0169
325 0.0169
423 0.0013
503 0.0013
Table 3.2: Top five synergistic information centralities for combinations of two
edges.
{i, j} C∆Iij
{423, 503} 0.2609
{309, 349} 0.1471
{349, 419} 0.0736
{112, 419} 0.0707
{309, 419} 0.0706
while the probability of simultaneous failures is p2. The probabilistic delta
centrality Cδij for two components i, j ∈ G becomes a function of a single
probability and simplifies to Equation (3.8):
Cδij = p(1− p)
(
C∆i + C
∆
j
)
+ p2C∆ij (3.8)
In the given example, if a decision is to be made to improve or protect exactly
two components (e.g., due to a limited budget, etc.) using information cen-
trality as the system performance metric, the pair of components that should
be selected changes with respect to the value of p.
For 0 < p ≤ 0.55, the highest value for CδIij is for the component set {309, 349}
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Figure 3.3: Probabilistic information centrality as a function of failure proba-
bility p for select pairs of components.
(Figure 3.3). This combination is second in importance with respect to the
synergistic information centrality. The probability of both components 309 and
349 failing simultaneously is less than 0.3025. For higher failure probabilities,
p > 0.55, the set {423, 503} is the best selection. This agrees with the top
ranked pair in Table 3.2. In general, the probabilistic delta centralities, under
the highly unlikely assumption of independent and equal failure probabilities
with p = 1, is equivalent to the implied assumptions and results for synergistic
delta centralities.
The values for probabilistic information centralities of the top three pairs of
components from Table 3.2, i.e., {423, 503}, {309, 349}, and {349, 419}, are
plotted in Figure 3.3. The third ranked pair of important components in Table
3.2, which are also the top two components based on a ranking of the individual
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information centralities (Table 3.1), are never the optimal mitigation choice
across all values of p. Clearly, synergistic delta centrality captures only one
aspect of the full spectrum of analysis possible with the probabilistic delta
centrality approach.
The simplifications related to independent and equal failure probabilities are
not necessary with the probabilistic centrality measures. Realistic failure prob-
abilities as induced by various hazards (e.g., the probabilities of damage states
associated with an earthquake of a given magnitude) are easily incorporated
in the calculations.
Note that the probabilistic delta centrality requires the calculation of all syn-
ergistic delta centralities which may be very costly depending on size of the
network and performance metric selected. For example, for this random graph
with 200 nodes, it took about one week to calculate the synergistic delta cen-
trality for k = 2 distributed in 30 parallel threads in a 2.4 GHz server. If
we had k > 2, the number of combinations to evaluate would increase ex-
ponentially. Therefore, in practice, its use is limited by this computational
considerations.
3.3. Concluding Remarks
Network component importance measures for mitigation decision-making using
may provide misleading guidance. This is indicated with the analysis driven
by the probabilistic delta centrality, a novel CIM which accounts for probabil-
ities of component failures. Unfortunately, the computational limitations of
the probabilistic delta centrality are an obstacle. Nevertheless, the empirical
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results from its use shed light on desirable characteristics for component-level
mitigation decision support. Any pre-disaster ranking which does not ade-
quately address uncertainty has limited decision support value. Even under
the simplifying assumption that all elements fail independently and with equal
probability, the previous example has shown that they may not follow deter-
ministic rankings.
There are other limitations for CIMs. They are completely independent of
external economic constraints and others that may prevent improvement in
certain components like social, political and safety limitations. The inclusion
of these limitations would not longer guarantee that highly ranked compo-
nents should be prioritized for mitigation. In addition, this method cannot
handle the discrete levels of improvement that some component networks may
presented as noted in Chapter 2. Due to all these reasons, we recommend to
exclude CIMs as a possibility for stochastic mitigation.
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Chapter 4
Incorporating Failure Complexity
in SND
The interdisciplinary nature of hazard mitigation planning requires decision
frameworks to be easily adapted to the input from simulations developed by
domain experts (e.g. geologist, hydrologist, civil engineers). The common
ground for these experts is Monte Carlo simulation. Several layers of Monte
Carlo simulations (from hazard simulation to network damage estimation)
outputs a dataset of probable failure patterns for the network. This dataset
encapsulates a high amount of complexity modeled by a diverse set of experts.
Thus, a compelling decision support tool should take advantage of the avail-
ability of these models and provide guidance with respect to realistic system
constraints. However, current solution approaches for the stochastic network
design (SND) problem do not benefit from these advances. In this chapter, we
propose a way to include this rich dataset in solving this kind of problems.
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4.1. Adapting SND to Mitigation
In the general SND problem, networks present stochastic characteristics in
diverse ways. For example, nodes/links can be present or absent with a prob-
ability, or link capacities, weights or lengths may take discrete or continuous
values in a stochastic way, which may represent the traffic status for a given
hour of the day. Management actions can change these probabilities. SND
includes the costs linked to actions to search for a suitable management strat-
egy. This general problem can be formulated for network mitigation in the
following manner.
Let G = (N , E) be the a graph (directed or undirected) defined by a set
of nodes N and a set of edges E ⊆ N × N that mathematically represent
a network. The network components (including both nodes and edges) are
indexed from 1 to N . Assume the state of any component as being either
functional (survived) or non-functional (failed) after a disruptive event. Let
pi be the survival probability [21], which is the probability of the component
i to survive and can be determined by structural analysis [41]. Conversely,
1− pi denote the probability of failure for component i. Let p = 〈p1, · · · , pN〉
be the representation of the current state of the network component’s survival
probabilities.
Realistically, a component’s survival probability value can not be improved to
any level (improvement in survival probabilities is not continuous as explained
in Chapter 2). As such, we assume that a component’s survival probability
can be improved according to a finite set of discrete values (e.g., a building
might be retrofit to a higher code level resulting in a specific shift in the
structure’s fragility curve). Each survival probability increment is associated
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with a list of possible levels of improvement according to available mitigation
interventions. For example, a building with survival probability 0.90 may have
three levels of improvement (0.93, 0.95, and 0.97) based on retrofits associated
with enhanced building codes. Each level of improvement has a cost associated
with labor, materials, and other required resources. Furthermore, we realize
that for decision-makers there may be other concerns besides finances such
political, social, or safety limitations that prevent interventions for certain
components.
Among the constraints that this problem considers are the following. It may
be that due to social, political, safety or other issue it is not possible to improve
one component or a combinations of components. There may be constraints
on the number of components to be improved imposed by external regulations.
Additionally, budgetary or resource limitations need to be addressed.
The problem objective relates to the expected value of a post-disruption per-
formance metric ϕ that is aligned with a desirable outcome for G. Many
performance metrics exist in the literature relating to various infrastructures,
e.g., travel time in transportation systems [42], expected cost of direct hazard
damage [43], commodity flow [11], among others. The decision variable is the
vector x that represents the discrete improvements to be performed in the
network having p as baseline.
In summary, the problem addressed is to minimize post-disruption impact
on ϕ by choosing network components for mitigation interventions that im-
prove their survival probabilities for a given hazard subject to limited financial
resources and other political, social, and/or safety standards that impose con-
straints on component selection.
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4.2. Data-based Stochastic Network Mitigation
Our proposed methodology called data-based stochastic network mitigation is
completely different from the sample average approximation (SAA) introduced
in Section 2.2. The approach ingests data from Monte Carlo simulations to
build up a probabilistic framework that supports constrained optimization.
This constrained optimization is driven by a metaheuristic search whose ob-
jective is to look for near-optimal values of performance metric ϕ. This process
is facilitated by a statistical learning model that relates ϕ with survival prob-
abilities associated with improvement strategies. Therefore, a probabilistic
representation of the simulation dataset is required for the construction of this
statistical learning model.
Figure 4.1: Overview of the proposed methodology.
This methodology has three steps to build the statistical learning model (Sec-
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tions 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3). Then, it uses the regression model to find near-
optimal solutions in a constrained optimization framework (Section 4.2.4),
and finally correct these solutions (Section 4.2.5). These steps are depicted in
Figure 4.1.
4.2.1 Simulation-based data generation
The simulation data should be based on hazard specific and component specific
fragility curves. A fragility curve depicts the probability of a component ex-
ceeding a given damage state as a function of hazard intensity. Once a hazard
intensity is selected for analysis, Monte Carlo simulations and damage estima-
tor models are used to estimate the impact to system components. Oftentimes,
the damage states include multiple discrete levels (e.g., slight, moderate, exten-
sive, complete), but converting to a binary representation (functional and non-
functional) is straightforward, and arguably appropriate for failures caused by
a disaster [44]. The results from the collection of Monte Carlo realizations
provide a rich set of data that represent likely failure patterns.
Figure 4.2: Multi-layer Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS).
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Finally, for each of the simulation realizations, the network performance metric
ϕ is computed. We refer to the combination of plausible failure patterns and
the associated performance metric evaluations as a subset of the realization
space and denote the dataset as Ω containing n observations. If the network
contains N components, then an example excerpt of Ω could look like Table
4.1, where a value of 1 denotes that a component is functional (survived) and
a value of 0 denotes that a component has failed. The data in Ω is used
to estimate a probabilistic space which incorporates expected values of the
performance metric. The average of each column from this dataset (from 1 to
N) is designated as the baseline state for the network survival probabilities.
Table 4.1: Example observations in realization dataset Ω.
Realization Component 1 Component 2 · · · Component N ϕ
1 1 1 · · · 0 13.32
2 0 1 · · · 1 14.81
...
...
...
...
...
...
n 1 0 · · · 1 12.74
4.2.2 Probabilistic data transformation
A subset of the probabilistic space is denoted as Ψ, and it relates components
survival probabilities with expected values of the performance metric. This is
accomplished by sampling with replacement1 η rows from Ω. The component
statuses and ϕ values from each of the η samples are averaged together to create
a dataset Ψ withm observations and N+1 values. Thus, each observation in Ψ
is a vector of survival probabilities p and an average of the performance metric
1Sampling with replacement allows to cover more values in the probabilistic space.
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that is denoted as ϕ¯. An example of this dataset is illustrated in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Example observations in probabilistic dataset Ψ.
Prob.
Sample Component 1 Component 2 · · · Component N ϕ¯
1 0.68 0.88 · · · 0.96 12.62
2 0.72 0.92 · · · 0.76 12.92
...
...
...
...
...
...
m 0.88 0.8 · · · 0.84 13.22
The selection of the sample size η needs some reflection because it affects the
accuracy of the statistical model in two conflicting ways. First, η affects the
accuracy of the expected performance metric ϕ¯: the higher η is, the more
accurate ϕ¯ is (law of large numbers). Second, η governs the number of prob-
abilistic samples that are going to fall within the prediction boundaries for
the statistical model (i.e. where this model is going to be predicting when
used for optimization). Each of the columns of the probabilistic dataset follow
a Binomial sample proportion distribution which approximates to a normal
distribution with mean equals to pi and variance of pi(1 − pi)/η. Therefore,
if η increases, σ shrinks, which means that by increasing η, some parts within
the prediction boundaries may have fewer examples, which is undesirable to
train the statistical model as it may compromise the accuracy of the predic-
tions within these boundaries. Thus, the selection of η needs to consider the
tradeoffs between accuracy of ϕ¯, and accuracy of the statistical model in the
optimization framework.
The following considerations can be taken to suggest a way to handle this
tradeoff. As noted before, the survival probabilities in Ψ for each component
follow approximately a normal distribution with mean pi (baseline survival
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probability for component i). The lower boundary of prediction is always
going to pi, and the upper boundary depends on the probabilities associated
with the feasible levels of improvements. The difference between the upper and
lower boundary for a component i is called the range of prediction (denoted
as Ri), which can be viewed as a deviation from the mean. Thanks to this,
a relationship between Ri and σi can be formulated in Equation (4.1) so that
most data is going to fall within the range of prediction. The standard devia-
tion is multiplied by 2 to ensure the tail of the Gaussian within the boundaries
is not too thin, i.e. not many observations near the upper boundary.
Ri ≤ 2 · σi ≈ 2 ·
√
pi(1− pi)/η (4.1)
4.2.3 Statistical modeling
Statistical learning methods, especially non-linear machine learning models,
are designed to fit the complex relationships between inputs and outputs em-
bedded in the probabilistic data Ψ. We employ such methods to derive f as
an estimate of the relationship between p¯ and ϕ¯, i.e., ϕ¯ ≈ f(p) = ϕ¯p, where
ϕ¯p is the predicted average performance value to be optimized.
The focus on building a machine learning model for this methodology is on
predictability. We want this model to be able to predict the expected perfor-
mance metric for an improvement strategy that we want to evaluate because
these predictions will be used to evaluate how good a feasible solution is.
Thus, it is recommendable to try models with high predictability as boosted
and ensemble methods, deep neural networks, and others.
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4.2.4 Optimization formulation
The mathematical formulation of this problem follows:
max (or min) ϕ¯p (4.2)
s.t. cost(x) ≤ Budget (4.3)
xi ≤ li ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N} (4.4)
zi =

1, xi > 0
0, xi = 0
∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N} (4.5)
N∑
i=1
zi ≤ k (4.6)
xi ∈ Z≥0 ∧ zi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N} (4.7)
The decision variable x = 〈x1, · · · , xN〉 are integers denoting the improvement
options for each component, where for example, x1 = 0 implies that compo-
nent 1 should be left at its baseline state of p1, whereas x1 = v implies that
component 1 should be retrofit to level v > 0 which will result in a higher
survival probability than the baseline. The function cost(x) relates discrete
survival probability improvements with their intervention costs. The param-
eter li is the maximum level of improvement for component i; zi is a binary
variable that takes on a value of 1 if component i is selected and 0, otherwise;
and k ≤ N is the total number of components available for enhancement.
Constraint (4.3) represents the economic limitations. Constraint (4.4) fixes the
maximum level of improvement for each component. If mitigation efforts are
not feasible for component i (due to physical, political, or other reasons) li is
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set to zero. Constraint (4.5) relates xi and zi. Constraint (4.6) sets a limitation
on the number of components that can be enhanced. Constraint (4.7) sets the
domain for the decision variables.
The solution method for this optimization problem depends on the selected
statistical model and the function cost(x). If cost(x) is linear or easy to lin-
earize, it may be worth trying a linear regression model because it would allow
us to use a MIP (mixed-integer programming) solver and guarantee getting to
the global optima. On the other hand, having non-linear relationships in our
optimization formulation may required approaches as metaheuristic search,
which provide local optima solutions. In the latter case, as metaheuristic ap-
proaches are stochastic methods, the search should be repeated with different
seeds to find several different solutions from which the best one should be cho-
sen. Whether the solutions are global or local optima, they will be represented
as x∗ in the rest of the thesis.
4.2.5 Correction of expected performance metric value
The objective value ϕ¯p of the solution(s) obtained in the previous step are
predicted values of the expected performance metric. There are two sources
of error for this estimate: the sampling error known as standard error of the
mean (Section 4.2.2), and the error of the statistical model (Section 4.2.3).
The standard error of the mean is estimated with Equation (4.8).
σϕ¯ ≈ s/√η (4.8)
where s is the standard deviation of the performance metric in the realization
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dataset, and η is the sample size calculated in Section 4.2.2. On the other
hand, the error of the statistical model can be estimated from the square root
of the mean squared error of the model predicting in the test set. Therefore,
these ϕ¯p are inaccurate estimates, however, they are useful for exploring the
solution space. Once solutions x∗ have been identified, the inaccurate estimate
for its performance metric can be corrected in the following manner.
A new realization dataset similar to Ω with size n′ can be generated by simulat-
ing the system with the new survival probabilities obtained from the solution
x∗. Then, 1
n′
∑n′
i=1 ϕ, which converges to the actual expected performance met-
ric as n′ goes to infinity (law of large numbers), can be a better estimated of
the expected performance metric given the selected improvements. This value
will be denoted as ϕ¯c.
To select a value for the sample size n′, we suggest the following procedure
based on confidence intervals.
1. Calculate the performance metric ϕ for a set of m ∈ N failure patterns
generated using probabilities associated with solution x∗.
2. Calculate the performance metric mean ϕ¯m and standard deviation sm.
The sub-index m represents that these point estimates were calculated
with the initial m samples.
3. Select a desired level of error  (multiplied by ϕ¯ results in the margin of
error) and a significance level α for that margin of error.
4. Use Equation (4.9) to get a lower bound for n′ where Z1−(α/2) is the
z-score of the standard normal distribution. Use student-t-distribution
rather than the normal distribution for m < 30.
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n′ ≥
(
Z1−(α/2) · sm
 · ϕ¯m
)2
(4.9)
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Chapter 5
Example 1: Shelby County
Transportation Network
5.1. Scenario Setup
The network topology from Shelby County, Tennessee is utilized to demon-
strate an application of the proposed methodology for a seismic event. Shelby
County is located in the southwest part of the state of Tennessee, and con-
tains the city of Memphis, which is the second-largest metropolitan area in
Tennessee.
Figure 5.1 shows a simplified Shelby transportation network in which only
major highways and their bridges are depicted. The components considered
vulnerable to an earthquake hazard for this study are the 24 bridges portrayed
in the figure, i.e. N = 24. The nodes are either intersections of major highways
or intersections of a highway with the limits of the county.
For a given earthquake hazard, the reliabilities of the bridges are known, yet for
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Figure 5.1: Shelby County transportation network, only major highways de-
picted
demonstration purposes are assumed to be equal at 0.8. Further assumptions
are that each bridge can be improved up to four different levels of reliabil-
ity (0.85, 0.9, 0.95, and 0.97) and the associated costs are known ($100,000,
$220,000, $300,000, and $360,000). The objective is to maximize the post-
disaster performance network efficiency.
Four constraint cases for long-term mitigation are studied separately. They
are motivated by real-world limitations and selected to use the mathematical
constraints described in 4.2.4.
Case 1 Select at most three bridges to improve with unlimited budget.
Case 2 Budget available of $500,000.
Case 3 Budget available of $1,500,000.
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Figure 5.2: Levels of improvement with associated survival probabilities and
costs.
Case 4 Two bridges with the highest delta centrality (44 and 35) can not be
improved due to social/political reasons. Budget available of $1,500,000.
5.2. Application of Methodology
5.2.1 Data Generation and Transformation
The failure data for each component is generated via Monte Carlo simulation
using independent Bernoulli trials with probability of success equal to 0.8.
Once the whole dataset is generated, the network efficiency (Equation (3.2) is
calculated for each network failure pattern.
For this example, the prediction boundaries for all components are 0.8 as lower
boundary and 0.97 as upper boundary (within these boundaries the statistical
model is going to predict). Let us apply Equation (4.1) to have an upper
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bound for η.
0.97− 0.80 ≤ 2 ·
√
0.8 · 0.2/η
η ≤ 22.15
Then, we select a round number for η that is below 22.15: η = 20. A less precise
way to select η is visually by plotting histograms of the survival probabilities of
each component for different values of η. Figure 5.3 shows that the histogram
for η = 20 is more suitable than its counterpart with η = 40 because the
Gaussian tail is thicker for values around 0.95, which will help the learning
algorithm to make better predictions for those probability values.
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Figure 5.3: Histograms of component survival probabilities. Left, sampled
with η = 20; right, sampled with η = 40.
5.2.2 Statistical Modeling
A random forest is used as the statistical learning model to learn the complex
relationships embedded in the probabilistic dataset. First, this probabilis-
tic dataset (20,000 observations) is divided in two: train set (80%) and test
set (20%). To select appropriate parameters for this random forest model, a
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cross-validation with k = 5 is performed within the train set with the hyper-
parameter grid described in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Hyper-parameter values considered in tunning the random forest.
Selected in bold.
Hyper-parameter Values
No. of estimators 200, 400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600, 1800, 2000
Maximum depth 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, None
Max. features on split N,
√
N
In Table 5.1, the number of estimators is the number of trees that are going to
be part of the ensemble. The maximum depth controls the depth of each tree
in the ensemble. The maximum number of features on split is the number of
features that will be considered in each split. In the case of the N option, it
considers all the features for split. In the case of the
√
N option, it considers
a number of features equal to the square root of the total number of features.
The metric used to tune these hyper-parameters is the mean squared error
(MSE).
With the tuned hyper-parameters (shown in bold in Table 5.1), a learning
curve (Figure 5.4) is built running 5-fold cross-validation repeatedly for several
training set sizes. It can be noted in Figure 5.4 that the current random forest
model has a low training error compared with the validation error, which is a
sign of overfitting. In this cases, it is recommended to reduce the complexity of
the model using regularization. For this specific random forest, the parameter
maximum observation per leaf node is selected as a regularization parameter.
After experimenting with several values for this parameter, we select to set
it to be 200 (based on its validation error). The learning curves after this
regularization are now closer, which suggests that the new model is less biased
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and apt for better generalization.
In addition, from this learning curve, it can be noted that a size of 2,500 is
necessary to avoid overestimation of the validation error. This result tell us
two things: (1) using 2,500 samples for training in cross-validation should be
ensured to get a proper error estimation for tuning; (2) to meet the requirement
in (1) with 5-fold cross validation, it is needed to have at least 2, 500× 5/4 =
3125 samples for training. Therefore, we do not need to use the 16,000 samples
that were initially generated by the probabilistic transformation.
The final model was build with the parameters from the cross-validation and
regularization. Its performance metrics mean squared error (MSE) and mean
absolute error (MAE) were 2.32×10−6 and 0.0012 respectively. To have other
assessment of the quality of the model, we made a reliability curve for the
test set shown in Figure 5.5, where the closest the red line is to the gray
dashed, the lower the bias error. This curve answers the question: “Given a
predicted average ϕ¯p, what is the most likely observation of the actual ϕ¯?” It
can be noted that the lower extreme has high bias error, therefore, it should
be expected that those those values the prediction is overestimating the actual
average performance metric. In contrast, the other end of the graph seems to
have a low bias.
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Figure 5.4: Learning curve for random forest model before (above) and after
(below) regularization.
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Figure 5.5: Reliability curve for final random forest model. Gray dashed line
is a perfect reliability curve. Red is actual.
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5.2.3 Optimization
A genetic algorithm is used to explore the probabilistic solution space using
the previous machine learning model to estimate the expected value of the
performance metric for each improvement strategy. The selected parameters
are presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Genetic algorithm parameters.
Parameter Value
Cross-over probability 0.5
Mutation probability 0.2
No. of Generations 500
Population Size 800
In Table 5.2, the cross-over probability is the likelihood of two parent solutions
to be combined to get new children solutions; otherwise, they will not change.
This probability is suggested to be set to 0.5 [45]. The mutation probability
is associated to changing one of the chromosomes of children solutions. The
number of generations sets how many times old population are going to perish
to give birth to new ones. Finally, the population size is the number of indi-
viduals (solutions) in each generation. The last three parameters are set via
empirical analysis.
In order to run the genetic algorithm with the selected parameters, the con-
straints must be defined. Each constrain case is related to a mathematical
constraint introduced in Section 4.2.4 in the following manner.
Case 1 Set k = 3 in Constraint (4.6)
Case 2 Set Budget = $500, 000 in Constraint (4.3)
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Case 3 Set Budget = $1, 500, 000 in Constraint (4.3)
Case 4 Set li = 0 for bridges 44 and 55 in Constraint (4.4) and set Budget =
$1, 500, 000 in Constraint (4.3)
Note that the function cost(x) from Constraint (4.3) is non-linear for this
problem, thus, it can be coded as a look-up table.
Metaheuristic approaches are stochastic methods, therefore, the search for
solution for each constraint case should be repeated with different random
seeds to find several different solutions from which the best one should be cho-
sen. The corrected estimates of performance metric for each of these solutions
should be compared to select a final solution for each case.
5.2.4 Correction of Predicted Performance Metric ϕˆp
In Equation (4.9), Z1−(α/2) for level of significance α = 0.05 will take Z0.975 =
1.96. Then, we decide to have a level of error of  = 1%. Taking m = 1000, we
can calculate the average performance metric ϕ¯m and the standard deviation
for the performance metric sm for each of the solutions. The following is an
extract of the best solutions for each constraint case. Remind that for each
constraint case there were several runs of the genetic algorithm to ensure get
several local optima. Each of these local optima has to be corrected.
Case 1 ϕ¯m = 0.1325 and sm = 0.0067 result in n′ ≥ 98.22
Case 2 ϕ¯m = 0.1305 and sm = 0.0083 result in n′ ≥ 155.40
Case 3 ϕ¯m = 0.1337 and sm = 0.0056 result in n′ ≥ 67.39
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Case 4 ϕ¯m = 0.1327 and sm = 0.0061 result in n′ ≥ 81.18
Looking at the lower bounds for n′ for each constraint case, it is clear that
the average performance metric calculated with 1,000 samples fulfills the sig-
nificance level and level of error required. Therefore, the calculated values for
ϕ¯m can be used as the corrected performance metric ϕˆp, which are presented
in Table 5.3.
5.3. Results and Discussion
The solutions x are presented in Table 5.3 for each of the four cases described.
The solutions from the proposed approach are compared to a CIM ranking
based approach using the individual information centrality C∆Ii introduced in
Section 3.1.1.
From Table 5.3, a key finding is that the CIM-ranking has a mixed and even
poor relationship with the best solutions for a decision maker. In Case 1, when
three bridges are desired, bridge 34, ranked third according to the CIM, is not
chosen to be improved. In Case 2, with a restrictive budget, the priority is
on bridges ranked fourth and fifth rather than bridges ranked second or third.
In Case 3, when the budget increases to $1,500,000, five bridges are chosen
from the top five CIM ranked positions, however, the level of improvement is
does not correspond perfectly to their CIM ranking. In the final case in which
the two bridges with the highest information centrality values are removed
from consideration, the CIM ranking would fail to recognize the importance
of bridges 21, and 14 – all ranked relatively low according to the C∆Ii value.
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For three of the cases presented, the absolute difference between ϕ¯p and the ϕ¯c
is higher than the expected MAE (0.0012). The reason for this is the following.
The MAE is calculated only for the regression model, and the error in ϕ¯p comes
from two sources: sampling error (0.0014 calculated using Equation (4.8)) and
the statistical model error (0.0015). Hence, it should not be a surprise to
have this difference out of the MAE range. It is worth reporting that from
our experiments with different seeds for the genetic algorithm and correcting
several different solutions for each case, it is noticed that the estimates of ϕ¯p
for this problem presented a strong correlation with ϕ¯c, which provides support
to say that the statistical model is useful for exploring the solution space.
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Table 5.3: Solutions for constrained cases with bridge indexes sorted by infor-
mation centrality C∆Ii . Each solution column contains the level of improve-
ment suggested for each component i, from 0 (no improvement) to 4 (highest
improvement). At the bottom, predicted average performance metric ϕ¯p (ob-
jective) and corrected expected performance metric ϕ¯c for each solution.
Bridge
ID CIM Solution x
∗(j) to constraint case j
i C∆Ii x
∗(1)
i x
∗(2)
i x
∗(3)
i x
∗(4)
i
44 0.0537 4 3 3 -
35 0.0380 4 0 3 -
34 0.0346 0 0 3 4
27 0.0328 4 1 2 3
43 0.0292 0 1 4 4
30 0.0156 0 0 0 0
41 0.0154 0 0 0 4
5 0.0149 0 0 0 0
24 0.0125 0 0 0 0
28 0.0124 0 0 0 0
37 0.0120 0 0 0 0
21 0.0116 0 0 0 1
9 0.0104 0 0 0 0
17 0.0082 0 0 0 0
26 0.0078 0 0 0 0
2 0.0077 0 0 0 0
14 0.0077 0 0 0 1
40 0.0067 0 0 0 0
19 0.0064 0 0 0 0
8 0.0062 0 0 0 0
15 0.0057 0 0 0 0
7 0.0043 0 0 0 0
22 0.0028 0 0 0 0
25 0.0018 0 0 0 0
ϕ¯p (predicted) 0.1306 0.1301 0.1312 0.1304
ϕ¯c (corrected) 0.1325 0.1305 0.1337 0.1327
Thous. of USD spent 1,080 500 1,480 1,480
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Chapter 6
Example 2: IEEE 30-bus Test
System
6.1. Scenario Setup
The IEEE 30-bus test system [46] (Figure 6.1) depicts a portion of the U.S.
Electric Power System and is utilized as an example where vulnerable compo-
nents are both nodes and links, with different survival probabilities and levels
of improvements. The graph simplification of this system (Figure 6.2) has 30
buses (nodes) and 41 transmission lines (links), i.e. number of components
N = 71. These 30 buses that are represented as nodes can be either generator
nodes, transmission nodes or demand nodes. For demonstration purposes, the
generation capacity of all generator nodes is set to 60 MW, each demand node
requests 20 MW, and transmission lines capacities are 50MW, which will be
represented as link capacities.
For a given earthquake hazard, the survival probabilities of the components
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Figure 6.1: Single-line diagram of the IEEE 30-bus test system [2].
are known, which will be assumed as 0.8 for generator nodes, 0.85 for demand
nodes, 0.85 for transmission nodes, and 0.8 for transmission links. The levels
of improvement will be also assumed to be different for each type of compo-
nent: generator nodes can only be improved to one level of survival probability
(0.87) at the cost of $350,000; demand nodes can be improved to two levels of
survival probability (0.9, 0.95) at the cost of $50,000 and $70,000, respectively;
transmission nodes can be improved to three levels of survival probability (0.9,
0.95, 0.97) at the cost of $15,000, $30,000 and $50,000, respectively; finally,
transmission lines can be improved to two levels of survival probability (0.85,
0.93) at the cost of $35,000 and $50,000. This information is summarized in
Figure 6.3.
The objective is to maximize the expected post-disaster electric demand met,
which in the simplified graph from Figure 6.2 can be calculated by solving
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G:23
G:13
G:1
G:2
G:22
G:27
D:24
D:15
D:14
D:12
D:16
D:17
D:18
D:19
D:20
D:10
D:21
D:4
D:3
D:7
D:8
D:26
D:29
D:30
T:11
T:9
T:6
T:5
T:28
T:25
Figure 6.2: Graph representation of the IEEE 30-bus test system [2]. The
dark grey nodes labeled with G represent the generator nodes, the white nodes
labeled with T represent transmission nodes, and the light grey nodes labeled
with D represent the demand nodes.
a max flow problem, which needs to connect all generator nodes to a source
node, and all demand nodes to a sink node. This performance metric will be
depicted as F and its value when the network is healthy is 350 MW.
Four constraint cases for long-term mitigation are studied separately. They
are motivated by real-world limitations and selected to use the mathematical
constraints described in 4.2.4. Case 3 and Case 4 are complicated decision
making scenarios that the proposed approach can handle.
Case 1 Budget of $300,000.
Case 2 Budget of $700,000.
Case 3 Budget of $700,000. No demand nodes can be improved.
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Figure 6.3: Levels of improvement with associated survival probabilities and
costs for each type of component.
Case 4 Budget of $700,000. The political decision of improving nodes G:22
and G:23 has been irreversible made without technical consultation.
A CIM ranking based on impact is presented to provide a better understanding
of the individual effects of isolated failures in the network. The delta centrality
that is derived from using the demand met as performance metric is denoted
as C∆Fi = (∆F )i/F . Table 6.1 presents a summary of this delta centrality
results for the IEEE 30-bus test system. Note that the most impactful el-
ements are the generators, subsequently, generator 13 and its adjacent link
and demand node have the same centrality value of 0.1429. The rest of the
nodes and links have little to none impact when failing in isolation. However,
this should not be interpreted as they are not important because there may
be simultaneous component failures that are both probable and impactful, as
discussed in Chapter 3.
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Table 6.1: Component ID sorted by C∆Fi .
Components C∆Fi
G:2 0.2000
G:1, G:22, G:23, G:27 0.1714
D:12, G:13, (D:12, G:13) 0.1429
D:10, D:15 0.0571
D:3, D:4, T:6, D:19, D:24, T:25,
(G:1, D:3), (D:15, G:23) 0.0286
Rest (53 components) 0.0000
6.2. Application of Methodology
6.2.1 Data Generation and Transformation
Probable failures patterns are constructed using Monte Carlo Simulation based
on the baseline component survival probabilities. The computation of the
selected performance metric (demand met via solving the max flow problem)
is calculated in polynomial time, therefore, there is no constraint to work with
as many failure patterns as desired.
For this example, the prediction boundaries for each type of component are
different. The analysis to select η should be done using Equation (4.1) for
components that have the same lower predict bound because they share the
same mean for their Gaussian curve. Note that generator nodes and trans-
mission lines share the baseline probability of 0.8, which means that the range
of prediction for both will start at 0.8. On the other hand, transmission lines
can be improved to a higher probability than the generators. Thus, the upper
boundary for transmission lines will have fewer data points than the upper
boundary for generator nodes. Therefore, it is enough to analyze the type of
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component with the higher range of prediction, which are the transmission
lines.
0.93− 0.80 ≤ 2 ·
√
0.80 · 0.20/η
η ≤ 37.87
Similarly, demand nodes and transmission nodes share the same baseline prob-
ability: 0.85. The highest upper prediction boundary is for transmission nodes,
so we apply Equation (4.1) on those components.
0.97− 0.85 ≤ 2 ·
√
0.85 · 0.15/η
η ≤ 35.41
Considering these two upper bounds for η, we select η = 35. This is the
size of the sample to take from the realization dataset to generate the proba-
bilistic dataset. An example of the histogram for each type of component is
represented in Figure 6.4.
6.2.2 Statistical Modeling
A random forest is used as the statistical learning model to learn the complex
relationships embedded in the probabilistic dataset. First, this probabilis-
tic dataset (20,000 observations) is divided in two: train set (80%) and test
set (20%). To select appropriate parameters for this random forest model, a
cross-validation with k = 5 is performed within the train set with the hyper-
parameter grid described in Table 6.2.
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Figure 6.4: Histograms of component survival probabilities generated with
η = 35 for each type of component. A: generator nodes; B: demand nodes; C:
transmission node; D: transmission link.
In Table 6.2, the number of estimators is the number of trees that are going to
be part of the ensemble. The maximum depth controls the depth of each tree
in the ensemble. The maximum number of features on split is the number of
features that will be considered in each split. In the case of the N option, it
considers all the features for split. In the case of the
√
N option, it considers
a number of features equal to the square root of the total number of features.
The metric used to tune these hyper-parameters is the mean squared error
(MSE).
With the tuned hyper-parameters (shown in bold in Table 5.1), a learning
curve (Figure 6.5) is built running 5-fold cross-validation repeatedly for several
training set sizes. It can be noted in Figure 6.5 that the current random forest
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Table 6.2: Hyper-parameter values considered in tunning the random forest.
Selected in bold.
Hyper-parameter Values
No. of estimators 200, 400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600, 1800, 2000
Maximum depth 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, None
Max. features on split N,
√
N
model has a low training error compared with the validation error, which is a
sign of overfitting. In this cases, it is recommended to reduce the complexity of
the model using regularization. For this specific random forest, the parameter
maximum observation per leaf node is selected as a regularization parameter.
After experimenting with several values for this parameter, we select to set it
to be 500 (based on its validation error). The learning curves after with this
regularization are now closer, which suggests that the new model is less biased
and apt for better generalization.
In addition, from this learning curve, it can be noted that a size of 5,000 is
necessary to avoid overestimation of the validation error. This result tell us
two things: (1) using 5,000 samples for training in cross-validation should be
ensured to get a proper error estimation for tuning; (2) to meet the requirement
in (1) with 5-fold cross validation, it is needed to have at least 5, 000× 5/4 =
6250 samples for training. Therefore, we do not need to use the 16,000 samples
that were initially generated by the probabilistic transformation.
The final model is build with the parameters from the cross-validation and
regularization. Its performance metrics mean squared error (MSE) and mean
absolute error (MAE) were 51.8783 and 5.7398 respectively. To have other
assessment of the quality of the model, we made a reliability curve for the
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test set shown in Figure 5.5, where the closest the red line is to the gray
dashed, the lower the bias error. This curve answers the question: “Given a
predicted average ϕ¯p, what is the most likely observation of the actual ϕ¯?”
It can be noted that the extremes have high bias error, therefore, it should
be expected that those those values the prediction is more likely to be off by
either overestimating (lower extreme) or underestimating (upper extreme) the
actual average performance metric.
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Figure 6.5: Learning curve for random forest model before (above) and after
(below) regularization.
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Figure 6.6: Reliability curve for final random forest model. Gray dashed line
is a perfect reliability curve. Red is actual.
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6.2.3 Optimization
A genetic algorithm is used to find near optimal solutions in the probabilistic
space using the previous machine learning model to estimate the expected
value of the performance metric for each improvement strategy. The selected
parameters are presented in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Genetic algorithm parameters.
Parameter Value
Cross-over probability 0.5
Mutation probability 0.2
No. of Generations 500
Population Size 800
In Table 6.3, the cross-over probability is the likelihood of two parent solutions
to be combined to get new children solutions; otherwise, they will not change.
This probability is suggested to be set to 0.5 [45]. The mutation probability
is associated to changing one of the chromosomes of children solutions. The
number of generations sets how many times old population are going to perish
to give birth to new ones. Finally, the population size is the number of indi-
viduals (solutions) in each generation. The last three parameters are set via
empirical analysis.
In order to run the genetic algorithm with the selected parameters, the con-
straints must be defined. Each constrain case is related to a mathematical
constraint introduced in Section 4.2.4 in the following manner.
Case 1 Set Budget = $300, 000 in Constraint (4.3)
Case 2 Set Budget = $700, 000 in Constraint (4.3)
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Case 3 Set Budget = $700, 000 in Constraint (4.3) and set li = 0 for all
demand nodes in Constraint (4.4)
Case 4 Set Budget = $700, 000 in Constraint (4.3) and set xi = 1 for gen-
erator nodes G:22 and G:23 (level 1 is the maximum improvement for
generator nodes), i.e. all solutions to be explored will be generated set-
ting xi = 1 for those generator nodes
Constraint case 4 cannot be handled with any of the constraints presented
in Section 4.2.4. It requires to code the restriction directly to the genetic
algorithm. Finally, the function cost(x) from Constraint (4.3) is non-linear for
this problem, thus, it can be coded as a look-up table.
6.2.4 Correction of Predicted Performance Metric ϕˆp
In Equation (4.9), Z1−(α/2) for level of significance α = 0.05 will take Z0.975 =
1.96. Then, we decide to have a level of error of  = 1%. Taking m = 1000, we
can calculate the average performance metric ϕ¯m and the standard deviation
for the performance metric sm for each of the solutions. The following is an
extract of the best solutions for each constraint case. Remind that for each
constraint case there were several runs of the genetic algorithm to ensure get
several local optima. Each of these local optima has to be corrected.
Case 1 ϕ¯m = 219.48 and sm = 53.85 result in n′ ≥ 2, 312.96
Case 2 ϕ¯m = 230.58 and sm = 53.69 result in n′ ≥ 2, 082.83
Case 3 ϕ¯m = 221.17 and sm = 54.47 result in n′ ≥ 2, 330.10
59
Case 4 ϕ¯m = 234.66 and sm = 53.22 result in n′ ≥ 1, 975.99
Looking at the lower bounds for n′ for each constraint case, the final value
selected for n′ is 2,500 for all of the corrections. The corrected values using
this n′ are presented in Table 6.4.
6.3. Results and Discussion
In Case 1, because of the restrictive budget, improving a generator node is
not possible, thus, the solution must be a combination of other types of com-
ponents. The solution x∗(1) suggests to prioritize some components that are
close to generators, while other components were selected due to their strategic
position to reach other demand nodes (e.g. T:6). This selection is intuitive
because they are components needed to distribute electricity to other demand
nodes. In Case 2, when budget increases to $700,000, there are enough re-
sources to enhance a generator, but other components are prioritized because
their combination is found to be more effective to minimize impact (i.e. even
with a high individual impact, generator nodes are not the first option for
improvement). The solution suggested includes all improvements from Case
1 along with others that share the proximity to generator nodes and a C∆F
value higher than 0 (e.g. D:24). Nevertheless, others are less intuitive when
looking at its position and C∆F value (e.g. link T:9).
In Case 3, the budget level is maintained but no demand nodes can be improved
due to an external reason. Say, for example, that the delivering time for devices
needed to enhance demand nodes is too long for the desired planning schedule.
This constraint mandates that the resources previously invested in demand
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Table 6.4: Solutions for constrained cases with component ID sorted by com-
ponent type and index number. Each solution column contains the level of
improvement suggested for each component. At the bottom, predicted av-
erage performance metric ϕ¯p (objective) and corrected expected performance
metric ϕ¯c for each solution. Note that from the 71 components, only the ones
that have improvements are presented.
Component Solution x∗(j) to constraint case j
i x
∗(1)
i x
∗(2)
i x
∗(3)
i x
∗(4)
i
G:27 0 0 1 0
D:4 2 2 0 2
D:10 2 2 0 2
D:12 2 2 0 2
D:15 2 2 0 0
D:19 0 1 0 0
D:24 0 2 0 0
T:6 2 2 2 0
T:9 0 2 0 0
T:25 0 2 2 2
T:28 0 0 2 0
(G:1, D:3) 0 2 2 2
(G:2, T:6) 0 0 2 0
(D:4, D:12) 0 0 0 2
(D:10, D:20) 0 2 0 0
(D:10, G:22) 0 0 2 0
(D:12, G:13) 2 2 2 2
(D:15, G:23) 0 2 2 2
(G:27, D:29) 0 0 0 2
ϕ¯p (predicted) 208.73 209.41 208.99 213.11
ϕ¯c (corrected) 218.57 230.71 221.14 234.38
Thous. of USD spent 290 690 690 690
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nodes have to go to other type of components. Our method is straightforward
in handling this constraint: the only modification is to set to zero li for all
demand nodes. Only after this restriction, the method finds suitable to invest
in improving an expensive generator node.
In the final case in which nodes G:22 and G:23 have been decided to be in-
vested, and the budget remains $700,000 (as Case 2), the solution suggest to
remove the investment on some components close to G:22 and G:23 (e.g. D:15,
D:19, D:24), and allocate the resources in farther areas (e.g. links (D:4, D:12),
(G:27, D:29)) that are more vulnerable. In other words, the method finds out
that after these two close generators were enhanced, the area where they are
located is now less vulnerable than other areas in the network. Therefore,
the reward is higher when allocating the money in components that were not
considered in the solution of Case 2.
For all of the cases presented, the absolute difference between ϕ¯p and the ϕ¯c is
higher than the expected MAE (5.7398). The reason for this is the following.
The MAE is calculated only for the regression model, and the error in ϕ¯p comes
from two sources: sampling error (9.0993 calculated using Equation (4.8)) and
the statistical model error (7.2026). Hence, it should not be a surprise to
have this difference out of the MAE range. It is worth reporting that from
our experiments with different seeds for the genetic algorithm and correcting
several different solutions for each case, it is noticed that the estimates of ϕ¯p
for this problem presented a strong correlation with ϕ¯c, which provides support
to say that the statistical model is useful for exploring the solution space.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This work discussed and expanded two methods for mitigation decision mak-
ing in physical networks with an emphasis in including both uncertainty and
complexity of network failure. The probabilistic delta centrality, a novel cen-
trality measure that accounts for failure probabilities, shows how the expected
impact of components failures—that changes with their probability of failure—
does not correspond with individual and synergistic delta centralities. There-
fore, using these component importance measures would provide sub-optimal
improvement strategies. Consequently, when there is stochastic information
available, our data-based methodology is a better option. Our data-based
methodology leverages the realistic failure pattern data and converts this to
a probabilistic real-valued space through sampling to then employ in a novel
manner statistical learning models to estimate the function f , which captures
both uncertainty and complexity embedded in the network failure phenom-
ena like hazard intensities, hazard characteristics, failure correlations, and
dependencies among components. This function then becomes the objective
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in a problem suitable for constrained decision-making using mathematical op-
timization or metaheuristic search techniques. The two examples presented
showed its flexibility in incorporating complexity, and in handling intricate
constraints.
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Chapter 8
Future work
We envision that our data-based approach can be extended to solve other
type of stochastic network mitigation problems. For example, influence max-
imization in social networks could be assisted with our approach either using
simulated data obtained from contagion models. To implement this, a type
of event should be identified and simulated so that the state of the network
after the event can be expressed as a binary vector. Then, using the proce-
dure presented in this thesis, it can assist decisions regarding increasing the
probabilities of a node to be influenced.
In addition, we consider to be a useful extension to convert failure states
from a binary representation to a either discrete or continuous. From our
experience working with civil engineers, current Monte Carlo simulations are
able to provide discrete damage states. An example of using this information
to calculate the performance metric is when we have a network of bridges.
For instance, their capacity could decrease to 90% of their max capacity when
damage is slight, or to 0% when damage is extensive.
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